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Abstract
We analytically show that a common across rich/poor individuals Stone-Geary utility
function with subsistence consumption in the context of a simple two-asset portfolio-choice
model is capable of qualitatively explaining: (i) the higher saving rates of the rich, (ii) the
higher fraction of personal wealth held in stocks by the rich, and (iii) the higher volatility of
consumption of the wealthier. On the contrary, time-variant ￿keeping-up with the Joneses￿
weighted average consumption playing the role of moving benchmark subsistence consump-
tion gives the same portfolio composition and saving rates across the rich and the poor,
failing to reconcile the model with what micro data say.
Keywords: elasticity of intertemporal substitution, Stone-Geary preferences, two-asset
portfolio, household portfolios, wealth inequality, controlled di⁄usion
JEL classi￿cation: G11, D91, E21, D81, D14, D11
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21. Introduction
A vast literature studying the connection between consumption and portfolio choice has
been trying to explain a number of empirical regularities that are considered as stylized
facts. First, households with higher lifetime income exhibit higher saving rates.1 Second,
richer households tend to hold stocks while poorer ones either do not hold stocks at all, or
hold a lower fraction of their ￿nancial wealth in stocks.2 Third, stockholders￿consumption
growth is more volatile than that of non-stockholders.3
A fourth empirically motivated perception is that high-income households (who are
also stockholders) exhibit higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) compared to
poorer non-stockholding households.4 This distinction has led some researchers to assume
exogenously di⁄erent EIS across households as a building block for their models (typically,
constant-EIS utility functions where the EIS parameter di⁄ers).5 A typical criticism to as-
suming exogenously heterogeneous EIS is that one can generate any desired result through
￿(trivially) assuming convenient preferences￿ . For instance, assuming that some individuals
are born with a higher EIS will tend to directly imply a higher saving rate for them, that
these individuals will turn out to be richer, that they will tend to hold more stocks, and that
their consumption will be more volatile. Apart from the accusation that assumptions and
conclusions are too close, another criticism is that the potentially quanti￿able heterogeneity
of utility functions is di¢ cult to establish empirically. Although we are not against behav-
1 See, for example, Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004). They report a strongly positive correlation be-
tween saving rates and lifetime income and a less strong correlation between lifetime income and marginal
propensity to save.
2 See, for example, Poterba and Samwick (1995), Carroll (2002), and Guvenen (2009, p. 1722) for more
updated references and stockholding trends in the US.
3 See, for example, Mankiw and Zeldes (1991).
4 See, for example, Guvenen (2009, Section 3), for evidence on this statement.
5 For example, Guvenen (2009) and De Graeve, Dossche, Emiris, Sneessens, and Wouters (2009) use exoge-
nously heterogeneous EIS as a key assumption in their analysis. Notably, Carroll (2002) provides arguments
that the pattern of facts is against exogenous variation in risk tolerance, while in Carroll (2000) he proposes
an alternative explanation of the high saving rates of the rich based on bequest motives.
3ioral approaches to ￿nance and consumer theory, in this paper we explore the possibility
of reconciling models with the three empirical regularities about saving, stockholding, and
consumption volatility through a single utility function.
The goal of our analysis is precisely set. Using the simple Merton (1969) model as a vehi-
cle for our thought experiment, we confront two alternative concepts of subsistence consump-
tion with each other, in order to examine their promise for simultaneously resolving consump-
tion/savings and portfolio-choice puzzles. The ￿rst concept is the standard constant sub-
sistence level of consumption that we examine using a typical Stone-Geary (time-separable)





=(1 ￿ 1=￿), where
￿;￿ > 0. The second concept is the ￿keeping-up-with-the-Joneses￿ time-variant subsis-
tence level of consumption given by, u(c(t)) =
n￿
c(t) ￿ ￿ ￿ C (t)
￿1￿1=￿ ￿ 1
o
=(1 ￿ 1=￿), where
￿;￿ > 0 and ￿ C (t) stands for average consumption in a certain community. This second utility
function implies a fully external habit with time separability. We focus on the fundamen-
tal Merton (1969) framework in order to obtain simple analytical solutions that allow for
comparative static analysis which is robust in a way that numerical solutions cannot o⁄er.
What we ￿nd is sharp. The Stone-Geary formulation with time-invariant subsistence
consumption meets all four empirical regularities at the micro level: it generates (i) saving
rates, (ii) risky-asset portfolio shares, (iii) consumption-growth volatility , (iv) endogenous
consumption-choice dependent EIS, all four positively dependent on initial or current ￿nan-
cial wealth. Time-invariant subsistence consumption fails in producing a stationary relative
wealth distribution with di⁄erent EIS across the rich and the poor. On the contrary, the
Stone-Geary formulation with time-variant subsistence consumption produces a stationary
relative wealth distribution with di⁄erent EIS across the rich and the poor throughout the
whole equilibrium path, but fails to reconcile the three ￿rst empirical regularities appearing
4above. It implies that, (i) saving rates, (ii) risky-asset portfolio shares, (iii) consumption-
growth volatility, are all the same across the rich and the poor.
We view that the inability of the formulation with time-variant subsistence consumption
to reconcile the data is striking and that it sends a pessimistic message to researchers who
work on endogenizing stockholding and who want to simultaneously meet empirical regu-
larities of saving and consumption.6 Although the two-asset Merton (1969) model assumes
away any labor income, our qualitative results are likely to be robust in the typical sim-
ulation framework employed in the literature (see, for example, Haliassos and Michaelides
(2003)), provided that, in the presence of liquidity constraints, corner solutions are not too
dominantly frequent in equilibrium. We anticipate that, even in the presence of liquidity con-
straints, idiosyncratic uncertainty, ￿nite lives, and exogenous participation costs, households
will still be a⁄ected from the re-balancing e⁄ects of the time-variant benchmark consumption
along their life cycle, and there will be a tendency among the rich and the poor to exhibit
similar saving rates, portfolio choice, and consumption volatility.
Our focus on subsistence consumption using a common across agents utility function
has similarities with the approach of Wachter and Yogo (2009) who propose non-homothetic
utility but distinguish between basic goods and luxuries, assuming that people are less risk
averse about luxuries than about necessities. Wachter and Yogo (2009) also obtain the
result that the rich invest more in risky assets, simply because what they are risking is
mostly luxury consumption.7 The role of subsistence consumption is similar: the rich are
willing to take more risk, because the chances that any given wealth shortfall will jeopardize
their ability to consume the subsistence consumption are much smaller than for the poor,
6 For example, Guvenen (2009, p. 1723, and Supplemental Material) recommends a similar preference
formulation, assuming exogenous stock-market participation.
7 Yogo (2006) has used a similar approach to Wachter and Yogo (2009) distinguishing between durable and
nondurable consumption in order to analyze the cyclical behavior of stock returns.
5whose consumption is hovering around subsistence. We think that subsistence consumption
o⁄ers more parsimony as our approach allows to work with the consumer basket rather than
with micro-level consumer data, facing the additionally tedious task of having to distinguish
between luxuries and necessities. Perhaps this aspect is more appealing to macroeconomists
who work on idiosyncratic-risk heterogeneous agent models in order to study asset markets
among other questions.
Concerning the technical contribution of our paper, we are not the ￿rst who have techni-
cally investigated the two-asset Merton (1969) model using the Stone-Geary utility function
with time-invariant subsistence consumption. Karatzas et al. (1986) and Sethi et al. (1992)
mention explicit solutions to this problem among their other results regarding the possibility
of investor bankruptcy. Weinbaum (2005) is another case making use of the ability of the
model to land an explicit solution in order to apply it to the bond market. Yet, we o⁄er a
simpler solution approach based on undetermined coe¢ cients to the case of time-invariant
subsistence (our Proposition 1 in Section 2). On the contrary, we are not aware of other
studies that analytically work out the time-variant subsistence formulation. For solving the
model using ￿keeping-up-with-the-Joneses￿preferences, it is crucial to use an aggregation re-
sult that greatly simpli￿es the problem. Such an aggregation result appears in Koulovatianos
(2005, Theorem 3), and we demonstrate how to use this aggregation result in the context of
solving a portfolio-choice problem. Most importantly, we are not aware of any study that
uses the explicit solution of the two-asset Merton (1969) model with Stone-Geary preferences
in order to address empirical consumption/savings and portfolio choice regularities.
We examine the time-invariant subsistence consumption model in Section 2, while in
Section 3 we analyze the time-variant subsistence model. We discuss how our results can be
advanced and how they can ￿t, complement, and extend the existing literature in Section 4
6and in Section 5 we conclude.
2. Time-invariant Subsistence Consumption
Time is continuous, with t 2 [0;1). Consider the Merton (1969) two-asset model, where
an investor having initial wealth holdings k0 > 0 has the opportunity to invest in a risky
asset (investing a fraction ￿ of her wealth in the risky asset) and a risk-free asset.8 So, the
investor chooses the consumption path (c(t))t￿0 and the path of portfolio composition over













with ￿;￿;￿ > 0. The household￿ s budget constraint is,
dk (t) =
￿￿
￿(t)R + (1 ￿ ￿(t))r
f￿
k (t) ￿ c(t)
￿
dt + ￿￿(t)k (t)dz (t) , (2)
where R is the mean rate of return of the risky asset, rf is the risk-free rate (R > rf), and
dz (t) = "(t)
p
dt, where "(t) ￿ N (0;1), i.e. dz (t) is a Brownian motion.
2.1 Decision Rules and Dynamics of Financial Wealth
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (HJB) is given by,



























0 (k) , (4)
8 If we assume n ￿ 2 risky assets, the mutual fund theorem developed in Merton (1971) and also outlined







We make two assumptions, technical in nature, that enable us to secure that solutions
exist and that they are interior. The rationale behind these assumptions becomes obvious
in the process of proving Proposition 1 which appears below.9




Assumption 2 Parameter ￿ is restricted to be strictly below the strictly positive
value, ￿ ￿, characterized below:




































It is easy to verify that ￿ ￿ > 0 for any values of ￿;￿;R;rf > 0.10 Moreover, placing
such a parametric restriction on parameter ￿ may not prevent the quantitative matching
of observed/estimated elasticities of intertemporal substitution (EIS), since in this model
9 The need for some parametric restrictions arises even without the presence of subsistence consumption.
Yet, subsistence consumption places a few more constraints which become obvious in our simple model here
which o⁄ers analytical results. And still, in order to match data it is perhaps necessary to take analysis a
step further, matching labor-income time series patterns in a simulated model that is based on micro-data
observations. While specifying a more descriptive model and solving it numerically is beyond the scope
of this study (here, we want to make a single point about which preference speci￿cation with subsistence
consumption seems to be most promising), our analytical model helps in becoming familiar with some
technical di¢ culties of subsistence consumption: in this case, interiority involves identifying parametric or
other constraints technical in nature, a number of concerns that may be unpleasant. Nevertheless, we claim
that the subsistence-consumption model (and, in particular, the version of this section) is worth to be studied





































￿2 + 1 .
8EIS = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿=c).11 Proposition 1 provides the analytical solution to the model.
Proposition 1
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the solution to the problem expressed by the HJB
equation given by (3) is a decision rule for consumption,
c
￿ = C (k) = ￿k +   ,
where
￿ = ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)r
f ￿








  = ￿￿








a decision rule for portfolio choice,
￿










while the value function is given by,


















Proof See the Appendix.￿
11Barsky et al. (1997) o⁄er plausible numbers based on a combination of a survey approach and objective
observations. Blundell, Browning, and Meghir (1994) have estimated that the EIS of households in the top
income quintile is about three times that of households in the bottom quintile of the distribution. In his
calibration exercise for explaining asset prices, Guvenen (2009) uses values 0:1 for (poorer) non-stockholders
and 0:3 for (richer) stockholders. With the aid of parameter ￿, such values can be matched. It can easily be
veri￿ed that using a parametrization according to US estimates of stock and bond returns (see, for example,
Guvenen (2009, Table II, p. 1725)), R = 8%, rf = 2%, ￿ = 20%, and with ￿ = 1:5%, the implied level of the
upper bound ￿ ￿ is ￿ ￿ ￿ = 1:25. If we use ￿ = 4:5% and the stock/bond returns above (for example, aggregate-
economy models with idiosyncratic risk imply that rf < ￿), then the implied value for ￿ ￿ is ￿ ￿ ￿ = 1:8. In any
case, the implied value for ￿ ￿ gives ample space for plausible calibration approaches.
9On a technical note, the role of Assumption 2 is to secure that ￿ in Proposition 1 is
strictly positive. The role of Assumption 1 is obvious after looking at the functional form
of the value function, J (k), in Proposition 1, a crucial condition for guaranteeing that




+ ￿, which reveals another role of both Assumptions 1 and 2, which is to
meet the requirement that c ￿ 0.
Proposition 2 reveals the dynamics of household wealth, which secure that, in equilibrium,
k￿ (t) > ￿=rf for all t ￿ 0.
Proposition 2

























where z (t) =
R t
0 dz (s) with
R
being the stochastic (It￿) integral.
Proof See the Appendix.￿
2.2 Characterization of Saving and Portfolio Choices
With Propositions 1 and 2 at hand we proceed to characterizing the savings, consumption,
and stock-holding behavior of a price-taking household. Proposition 3 provides necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for having a saving rate which is increasing in wealth.
Proposition 3
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the saving rate of a household is strictly increasing
10in ￿nancial wealth if and only if,








Proof Fix any time instant t ￿ 0. Based on Proposition 1, direct substitution
of the decision rule for consumption, C (k), and also for portfolio choice, ￿(k),
into the household￿ s budget constraint given by (2), after some algebra, gives the
equilibrium savings level at time t,
S


























￿ (t)(R ￿ rf)k￿ (t) + rfk￿ (t)














which implies that ds￿ (t)=dk￿ (t) > 0 , ￿ > 0 , (7).￿
Proposition 4 is our immediate stock-holding result.
Proposition 4
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the portfolio share of stocks is strictly positive and
increasing in wealth.
Proof Immediate from ￿(k) of Proposition 1.￿
11Proposition 5 examines the relationship between the coe¢ cient of variation of consump-
tion and initial ￿nancial wealth and also the relationship between consumption growth and
current wealth.
Proposition 5
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the coe¢ cient of variation of consumption is strictly
increasing in initial ￿nancial wealth and the variance of the growth rate of con-
sumption is increasing in current ￿nancial wealth.
Proof See the Appendix.￿
Proposition 5 shows that the same utility function with subsistence consumption for all
households leads to a theoretical prediction which is closer to the empirical observation ￿rst
made by Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), that stockholders￿consumption growth is more volatile
than that of non-stockholders. Although in our analysis everybody holds stocks, the poorer
in our model hold a lower fraction of their wealth in stocks. Our analysis indicates that in
a more descriptive simulated model, perhaps one that includes stock-market participation
costs, a substantial fraction of poor agents may become non-stockholders.
2.3 Dynamics of inequality
A key feature of this simple partial-equilibrium analysis with price-taking households is
that inequality in ￿nancial wealth increases over time if everybody￿ s ￿nancial wealth grows
over time. From equation (6) it is easy to verify that the expected value of wealth of any
individual will grow at a strictly positive rate if and only if,
r








12which is equivalent to the condition given by equation (7), the necessary and su¢ cient
condition for having saving rates that increase in wealth. Considering two individuals, a
￿rich￿and a ￿poor￿according to their initial total asset holdings, kr;0 > kp;0 (subscripts








































Equation (8) implies that as k￿
p (t) increases over time, inequality in relative wealth increases
over time.
The feature that the model does not lead to a steady-state stationary distribution of rel-
ative wealth may be considered as unattractive. Chan and Kogan (2002) using an external-
habit model resolve the issue of having a long-run growth model with a stationary relative
wealth distribution. Scholars who study simulated models propose the preference formu-
lation of next model￿ s section (for example, see Guvenen (2009, footnote 7, p. 1723) and
his discussion in the paper￿ s conclusions regarding the extension of his model to long-run
growth analysis). We show that in the context of our model￿ s unit-root aggregate stock
market shocks this proposed preference formulation of ￿keeping-up with the Joneses￿bench-
mark subsistence consumption leads to less promising results: despite that it is capable of
producing a stationary relative wealth distribution and EIS that is increasing in wealth, it
nevertheless fails to meet all other micro data empirical regularities.
133. Time-variant Benchmark Subsistence Consumption





















where ￿ 2 (0;1) and with ￿ C (t) being average consumption in the economy in period t.12
Moreover, we would like to restrict ￿ so that all individuals in the economy have consump-
tion c(t) > ￿ ￿ C (t). This amounts to a restriction on ￿ which is driven by the distribution of
initial asset holdings. Yet, in order to identify such a parametric restriction involving initial
conditions and parameters, the model must be ￿rst solved under the working assumption
of having interior solutions.13 Preferences given by equation (9) assume ￿benchmark con-
sumption levels￿ .14 Such a utility function captures the "keeping-up with the Joneses" idea
of having consumption standards in￿ uenced by average consumption standards, with the
12For this formulation, see, for example, Guvenen (2009, footnote 7, p. 1723). These preferences fall into the
category studied in Koulovatianos (2005, Theorem 3) that gives perfect linear aggregation under certainty.
This means that, provided that all solutions are interior, also under aggregate uncertainty the aggregate level
of consumption, ￿ C (t), corresponds to the choice of a (perhaps ￿ctitious) consumer with wealth holdings equal
to the aggregate wealth level of the economy, ￿ K (t). This property will be proved to be true in equilibrium.
13Notice in the model with subsistence consumption above that the initial capital stock of the poorest
household, k0 is restricted to k0 > ￿=rf, which guarantees that all households in the economy have well-
de￿ned problems and interior solutions. Notice also that we were able to identify that restriction only after
we have solved the problem under the working assumption of interior solutions.
14This is also a variant of the preference formulation in Chan and Kogan (2002), which focuses on the
"external habit", in contrast to the formulation of Constantinides (1990), which focuses on the "internal
habit." The di⁄erence in our formulation is that it is not the stock of external habit but the ￿ ow of external
habit that in￿ uences behavior. As it will be shown below, in equilibrium, consumption paths of all agents
grow parallely. Given that in our model prices are exogenous, it would be di¢ cult to empirically distinguish
between the external and internal habit from simulated data from our model. A recent empirical study
investigating the relative importance of external vs. internal habits is Grishchenko (2009). Notice that the








so, for c = ￿ C, EIS = (1 ￿ ￿), and the formula ￿ C=c = (1=￿)(1 ￿ EIS=￿) reveals that empirically plausible
levels of the EIS can match observed consumption ratios ￿ C=c.
14quantitative impact of this in￿ uence moderated through parameter ￿. Clearly, we assume a
community of investors such that each investor is a price taker (for example, members of the
community invest in a globalized international market portfolio of stocks) and keeps track
of average consumption, ￿ C, of his her (local) community. The path of average consumption,
￿ C, over time is generated through the decision-making process of a ￿ctitious household that
possesses average initial wealth ￿ K0.15 This property is due to that perfect linear aggregation
holds in our model, and this we con￿rm once we derive our solution below.
The budget constraint of the individual is,
dk (t) =
￿￿
￿(t)R + (1 ￿ ￿(t))r
f￿
k (t) ￿ c(t)
￿
dt + ￿￿(t)k (t)dz (t) , (10)
however, in this case, keeping track of the dynamics of average consumption, ￿ C (t), is also
necessary. Because the (perhaps ￿ctitious) average household possessing ￿ K (t) units of wealth
also solves an optimal control problem, the household possessing k (t) units of wealth will
form a value function which depends on both the current level of its ￿nancial wealth, k (t),
and the current level of the poorest household￿ s ￿nancial wealth, ￿ K (t), i.e. the value function




. In doing so, the household with k needs to keep track of the
dynamics of the average household￿ s budget constraint (with wealth holdings ￿ K), although
the household with k does not control ￿ C (t) or ￿ K (t). Below we recon￿rm that the decision
rules of all individuals imply perfect linear aggregation. This budget constraint is,
d ￿ K (t) =
￿￿￿ ￿(t)R +
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿(t)
￿
r
f￿ ￿ K (t) ￿ ￿ C (t)
￿
dt + ￿￿ ￿(t) ￿ K (t)dz (t) , (11)
15This household is called a ￿representative consumer (RC)￿ , a ￿ctitious household who possesses average
wealth and who has a utility function composed by the utility functions of all other household types (this
holds in the case of preference heterogeneity ￿in the present paper all agents have the same preferences,
so, in our case, RC￿ s utility function is the same as everyone else￿ s), and whose choices coincide with all
aggregated choices of the community under any price regime. For further details on the concept of RC see
Caselli and Ventura (2000) and Koulovatianos (2005).
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the second partial derivative with respect to x, and the notation for the cross-derivative
is obvious. For an individual other than the (perhaps ￿ctitious) individual with wealth
holdings other than ￿ K, the paths ￿ C (t) and ￿ ￿(t) are generated through two decision rules,
￿ C (t) = C
￿ ￿ K (t)
￿
and ￿ ￿(t) = ￿
￿ ￿ K (t)
￿
which are consistent with consumer optimization of
the individual with wealth holdings ￿ K (t) for all t ￿ 0, and also the budget constraint given
by (11). First-order conditions are,
￿






























Proposition 6 states the solution to the above problem. Yet, interiority of solutions involves
making a parametric constraint which involves parameter ￿, given by Assumption 3.





where k0 is the initial wealth of the poorest household and ￿ K0 is the average
initial wealth.
16Using Assumption 3 we proceed to characterizing the interior solution of the model,
which is given by Proposition 6.
Proposition 6
Under Assumptions 2 and 3, the solution to the problem expressed by the HJB
equation given by (12) is a decision rule for consumption,
c
￿ = C (k) = ￿k ,
where
￿ = ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)r
f ￿







a decision rule for portfolio choice,
￿
￿ = ￿(k) = ￿
R ￿ rf
￿2 ,
while the value function is given by,


















Proof See the Appendix.￿
Corollary 1 characterizes the role of the decision rules implied by Proposition 6.
Corollary 1
Under Assumption 2, the solution to the problem expressed by the HJB equation
given by (12) implies that the saving rate, the portfolio composition, the coe¢ cient
of variation of personal consumption, and the variance of the growth rate of
consumption is the same across richer and poorer individuals.
17Proof Immediate after noticing that the dynamics of ￿nancial wealth of any
household follows a geometric Brownian motion over time with the same coe¢ -
cients for all households, irrespective of initial conditions.￿
In the absence of idiosyncratic labor-income shocks all households are subject to the
same aggregate shocks driven by shocks to stock-market-index returns, and inequality in the
distribution of relative wealth will be increasing over time. Moreover, in our analysis these
aggregate shocks follow a random walk, and decision makers take into account that each
shock realization has a permanent e⁄ect on wealth accumulation. Nevertheless, the results
of Propositions 3 through 5 point out that all empirical regularities (personal saving rates,
risky-asset portfolio shares, and consumption volatility, all being increasing in wealth, in
addition to having EIS increasing in wealth) are qualitatively consistent with the model￿ s
mechanics. It therefore seems promising to introduce time-invariant subsistence consumption
in a typical model of labor-income idiosyncratic risk with liquidity constraints in order to
avoid making assumptions about preference heterogeneity.
On the contrary, the exceptionally sharp result of Corollary 1 is certainly due to the aggre-
gation properties inherent in the Stone-Geary formulation. Previous papers on aggregation
such as Chatterjee (1994) and Caselli and Ventura (2000) emphasize that time-invariant and
time-variant subsistence level of consumption can lead to wealth-dependent saving rates.
What we ￿nd here is that the ￿keeping-up-with-the-Joneses￿formulation tends to rebalance
saving rates and, as it has become clear by this study, it rebalances portfolio choice among
the rich and the poor as well. This happens because the benchmark subsistence consump-
tion is subject to aggregation as well (it is proportional to the consumption level of the
￿representative consumer￿￿see Caselli and Ventura (2000) or Koulovatianos (2005) for a
18de￿nition of the concept). Yet, it was not obvious at all that this feature would survive under
portfolio choice, which is a key contribution of this paper. Yet, whenever a time-variant level
of benchmark consumption is exogenous, the knife-edge result of Corollary 1 generally fails
(on this see Caselli and Ventura (2000) and Koulovatianos (2005, Theorem 3) ￿the latter
also provides necessary conditions for the aggregation result with time-variant subsistence
consumption).
4. Discussion
One non-trivial question about using subsistence consumption which has a time-invariant
component in savings and portfolio-choice analysis is how to deal with the identi￿cation
of subsistence consumption levels. This is an open empirical question and it seems it will
take some e⁄ort until researchers reach consensus on how to estimate subsistence consump-
tion. Yet, some recent work gives strong empirical support for the existence of subsistence
consumption in utility functions and the empirical plausibility of Stone-Geary preferences
while it also provides new research directions. In particular, Donaldson and Pendakur (2006)
identify family-type subsistence consumption using a restriction on equivalence scales, called
￿Generalized Absolute Equivalence Scale Exactness (GAESE)￿ through demand-system
analysis. Koulovatianos et al. (2006, 2008) are able to test whether GAESE is a plau-
sible assumption to make, and ￿nd very strong evidence in favor of GAESE. Moreover,
Koulovatianos et al. (2006, 2008) propose a complementary survey approach for identifying
subsistence consumption, ￿nding strongly that in six countries and 49 cases they examine
subsistence consumption is always present playing an important role in comparisons of mate-
rial comfort among individuals living in di⁄erent family types. These advances provide tools
for tackling the demanding empirical question of how to estimate subsistence consumption.
19Another question that arises is whether the wealth restriction placed by Assumption 1
is a prohibitively tight constraint for matching micro data on wealth. In order to address
this question one needs to represent an equivalence of the wealth analysis of our simpli￿ed
model to the wealth analysis of a more complex framework that is capable of distinguishing
among more household resource variables in available micro data, such lifetime income from
both labor and ￿nancial assets. In particular, the de￿nition of k (t) in our model should be
seen as a composite form of wealth, able to encompass both income and observable wealth
measures that are available in existing micro databases, rather than being seen as a limited
measure of ￿nancial wealth in the data. A plausible way to interpret k (t) in our model is to
consider equation (2), apply the conditional expectations operator on both sides, solve the







0 r(￿)d￿E (c(t))dt ￿ PV EC (15)
where r(t) ￿ ￿(t)R + (1 ￿ ￿(t))rf is the return to investment subject to portfolio choice,
and ￿PVEC￿stands for ￿present value of expected consumption￿ .16 Notice that now the




which means that the present value of expected lifetime consumption should exceed the
present value of lifetime subsistence consumption discounted by the risk-free rate. A richer
version of the budget constraint given by (2), would distinguish between assets, a, and labor
income, y, having, for example, the form,
da(t) =
￿￿
￿(t)R + (1 ￿ ￿(t))r
f￿
a(t) + y (t) ￿ c(t)
￿
dt + ￿￿(t)a(t)dza (t) , (17)
16For details on how to solve equation (2) forward after having taken expectations on both sides, see, for
example, Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004, Ch. 2).
20and
dy (t) = ￿ (y;t)dt + ￿(y;t)dzy (t) , (18)
where zy (t) = ￿a;yza (t) +
p
1 ￿ ￿2
a;yz (t), with z (t) being a standard Brownian motion
independent of za (t) (za (t) is also a standard Brownian motion) and with ￿a;y 2 (￿1;1)
denoting the correlation coe¢ cient between asset returns and the income process.17 Applying
the conditional expectations operator on both sides of (17), solving the resulting equation
forward, and applying the transversality condition gives,








0 r(￿)d￿E (y (t))dt ,
where y (t) solves equation (18) and ￿PVEY￿stands for the present value of expected labor
income. Equation (19) implies that the requirement given by (16) becomes











The de￿nition of ￿nancial wealth, a, in (20) ￿ts realistically micro data of wealth and allows
a household to have zero or negative assets (negative net worth), justi￿ed by the fact that
such a household￿ s asset allowing for survival is its expected future income (either its time
endowment and ability to work and receive income, or its entitlement to external aid, such
as social security bene￿ts), which must exceed the present value of subsistence consumption
discounted by the risk-free rate. So, our de￿nition of k should be perceived as a broad
17Such a general formulation has been analyzed by Henderson (2005, p. 1241), while more speci￿c versions
of equation (18) have been studied by Du¢ e et al. (1997, p. 755) and Koo (1998).
21measure of resources, namely k0 = a0 +PV EY . We emphasize that the expression given by
(20) does not constitute a result that corresponds to the solution of the savings and portfolio
choice problem which is subject to equations (17) and (18), an analysis that would be a key
extension to the present model. The expression given by (20) is only an interpretation of
Assumption 1 when a broader concept of lifetime resources is used.
Another issue is that in our model all households hold stocks, an implication standing
in strong contrast to the zero stockholding of most households observed in the data. On
this we think that a richer (simulated) version of our model with time-invariant subsistence
consumption and stock-market participation costs as the type of costs analyzed by Haliassos
and Michaelides (2003) is very promising for capturing this aspect of the data. To the ex-







plays a role in the process of molding numerical outcomes of such richer sim-
ulated models, there is promise for satisfactory simulation results. For example, Heathcote
et al. (2010, Fig. 19) who present wealth data indicate that the top 10% of wealth owners
possesses about 60% of overall wealth in the US, while the bottom decile holds zero wealth
steadily throughout the past 25 years. Setting R = 8%, rf = 2%, ￿ = 20% (see, for example,
the calibration exercise in Guvenen (2009, Table II, p. 1725)), and ￿ = 0:5, a group of per-
sons holding 1% of their portfolio in stocks (￿ = 1%) in our model should hold wealth that is
about 1.4% higher than ￿=rf (￿ is a free parameter in this exercise). For households holding
wealth two times higher than ￿=rf the implied ￿ is 37:5% (this means that the ratio of stocks
held by agents having wealth twice higher than subsistence is about 2 ￿ 37:5 compared to
agents who have wealth holdings 1.4% higher than subsistence who have ￿ = 1%), while
agents with wealth 20 times higher than subsistence hold about 20￿71:25 times more stocks
than those who have wealth holdings 1.4% higher than subsistence. Such relative numbers
22are in accordance with Poterba and Samwick (1995) and close to stockholding population
fractions discussed and calibrated by Guvenen (2009, p. 1722). We believe this simple ex-
ercise shows that, perhaps after introducing stock-market participation costs, to the extent








still at work, time-invariant subsistence consumption is a very promising element to intro-
duce in a model in order to match the relationship between wealth holdings and stockholding
seen in the data.
5. Concluding remarks
Researchers who work on endogenizing stockholding and who want to simultaneously meet
empirical regularities of saving and consumption tend to dislike the idea of assuming di⁄erent
preferences between rich vs. poor, or between stockholders vs. non-stockholders. For many
researchers it would be desirable not to pursue a behavioral explanation beyond standard
utility/choice theory, and to be able to achieve three stylized facts through a single utility
function, namely that the rich have: (i) higher saving rates, (ii) a larger fraction of their
wealth held in stocks, and (iii) higher consumption-growth volatility. Since it is a broadly
accepted stylized fact that the rich (and stockholders) exhibit higher EIS, it seems promis-
ing to achieve the above goal through assuming a single utility function with subsistence
consumption. Here, we have distinguished and studied two types of introducing subsistence
consumption: (a) a time-invariant level of subsistence consumption, and (b) a time-variant
level of subsistence consumption, ￿ ￿ C (t) ( ￿ C (t) is average consumption in a community at
time t, and ￿ > 0), with the latter formulation capturing the idea of ￿keeping-up-with-the-
Joneses￿preferences. We have analytically studied savings and portfolio choice in the simple
two-asset Merton (1969) model, and have shown that the formulation in (a) above is quite
23promising for achieving the goal of meeting all three stylized facts above, while the formula-
tion in (b) is not promising at all. Despite that the preference formulation in (b) generates
higher EIS for the rich in equilibrium, this heterogeneity in EIS is not capable of generating
any di⁄erence in saving rates and portfolio choice. The reason is, as future plans take into
account the evolution of ￿ C (t), marginal utility implied by the indirect utility function tends
to be re-balanced across the rich and the poor.18
Conveying this negative message for the role of Stone-Geary preferences with subsistence
consumption of the form ￿ ￿ C (t) is the central contribution of this paper. Another way of
interpreting our results is that assuming some time-invariant component of subsistence con-
sumption seems very promising for reconciling the implications of a savings/portfolio-choice
model with micro evidence if one wants to retain rational expectations without assuming
preference heterogeneity. Our study raises plausible questions for future research. A key ex-
tension is the empirical identi￿cation of subsistence consumption. Recent studies following
di⁄erent empirical approaches show promise in this regard.19 Perhaps the next two most
plausible questions to ask in future research should be addressed through a model such as
this of Haliassos and Michaelides (2003) with labor income, liquidity constraints, exogenous
stock-market participation costs, and even ￿nite lives. First, is a time-invariant component
of subsistence consumption capable of resolving both the qualitative and quantitative prop-
erties of the data expressed through points (i)-(iii) above? Second, does assuming ￿keeping-
up-with-the-Joneses￿benchmark subsistence consumption (of the form ￿ ￿ C (t)) tend to make
saving rates and portfolio choice the same among the rich and the poor in an environment
as di⁄erent as in Haliassos and Michaelides (2003)? We believe our analytical work in this
18See, for example, the role of equation (14) above.
19See, for example, Donaldson and Pendakur (2006) for a demand-system approach for identifying subsistence
consumption, and Koulovatianos et al. (2006, 2008) for doing so through a survey approach for di⁄erent
family types.
24study has clari￿ed what is most likely to expect and why, and that it can help researchers
make more promising preference assumptions (avoid less promising assumptions) for their
models, saving research time and e⁄ort.
256. Appendix - Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
We make a guess on the functional form of the value function, namely,




















From (22) and (4) it is,
c = b
￿￿k + ￿ ￿ b
￿￿! . (24)


































































26dividing both sides of (26) by b(k ￿ !)
1￿ 1































￿￿! ￿ ￿ . (28)
In order that the guess we made for J (k) be operative, it must be that we can ￿nd b and
! such that both the coe¢ cient of k in equation (28) and the constant part must both be
















￿￿ = ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)r
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! = ￿ ￿ b
￿￿!



















and after substituting (30) it is,
c =
"
￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)r
f ￿















27con￿rming the statement of the Proposition. It remains to verify that Assumption 2 guar-






















￿2 < 0 . (33)






















￿2 + 1 > 0 ,
which means that real roots exist, while the constant term of (33) reveals that both roots are
di⁄erent from zero and that they have opposite signs. Since there is a parametric restriction
that ￿ > 0, the formula for ￿ ￿ appearing in the statement of the proposition is the positive
root of the quadratic polynomial with respect to ￿ given by (33).￿
Proof of Proposition 2
Direct substitution of the decision rule for consumption, C (k), and also for portfolio



















































and after integrating (35) using It￿￿ s stochastic integral (while setting z (0) = 0 by conven-
tion), proves the proposition.￿
28Proof of Proposition 5
Fix any t > 0. From Proposition 1 it is C (k￿ (t)) = ￿k￿ (t) +  . From Proposition 2 we
can see that
E [C (k








rf +   (36)
where



























+ ￿ . (37)
So, apparently, the coe¢ cient of variation is,
CoeffV ar(C (k
￿ (t))) =
￿ fV ar[￿ (t)]g
1
2





and since both E [￿ (t)] and fV ar[￿ (t)]g
1=2 are strictly positive,20 this last equation implies
that dCoeffV ar(C (k￿ (t)))=dk0 > 0. Regarding the volatility of consumption growth,
direct substitution of the decision rule for consumption, C (k), and also for portfolio choice,




































































29Using C (k￿ (t)) = ￿k￿ (t) +   = ￿
￿
k￿ (t) ￿ ￿=rf￿






























￿^ k￿ + ￿
dz










￿^ k￿ + ￿
!2
dt ,
an increasing function of k￿.￿
Proof of Proposition 6






= a + b
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k ￿ ￿ ￿ K
￿￿ 1
￿ , (42)





















k ￿ ￿ ￿ K
￿￿ 1
￿￿1 . (44)
Combining (13) with (40) gives,
c = b
￿￿ ￿
k ￿ ￿ ￿ K
￿
+ ￿ ￿ C , (45)













When equations (45) and (46) are substituted into the individual￿ s budget constraint, equa-








































This last equation implies exact linear aggregation of the equilibrium law of motion of
￿nancial wealth among rich and poor. This means that the guess we have made is consistent
with the way we have set up the problem, and it remains to see whether there exists a
constant term b that validates the solution. Linear aggregation allows us to substitute for
￿ K and ￿ ￿ in equation (46) in order to characterize the portfolio choice of the household with
average wealth. Doing so leads to,
￿ ￿ = ￿
R ￿ rf
￿2 , (47)
and substituting (47) into (46) implies
￿ = ￿ ￿ = ￿
R ￿ rf
￿2 , for all k > 0 . (48)
Moreover, by linearly aggregating equation (45) we obtain
c = b
￿￿k , for all k > 0 , (49)
which includes ￿ K. Substituting equations (39) through (46) into the HJB equation given by









f￿ ￿k ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ K





￿k ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ K
k ￿ ￿ ￿ K
￿2
. (50)
31Substituting that ￿ = ￿ ￿ from (48) into (50) leads to the expression stated in the proposition.
Given this interior solution, the role of Assumption 3 is recon￿rmed in a straightforward
manner.￿
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